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A substantial number of the earlier school finance lawsuits alleged, as
a secondary cause of action, that the system of financing education under
attack violated the state constitution as well as the Federal Constitution.
Some of these suits relied upon state equal protection clauses while others
resorted to more obscure and less utilized state education clauses. With the
demise of the federal equal protection clause as a basis for school finance
litigation, school finance reform advocates have begun to turn their attention
toward the use of state constitutions for relief from the inequalities resulting
from present methods of financing education.
The complaint in Robinson v. Cahill,' which was filed before
Serrano,2 had been based on both federal and state grounds. The New
Jersey Supreme Court, only a few weeks after the decision in Rodriguez,3
clearly conveyed the message that, despite the interment of the federal
equal protection ground, school finance reform litigation could be successful
if the little-used state education clauses were resurrected. Thus this sym-
posium looks first at Robinson to see whether the strategy relied upon there is
applicable to other states.
Of the five states reviewed for this symposium, Washington and New Jersey
illustrate a litigation approach which relies principally on the state education
clause. In Michigan, the state equal protection clause was the primary basis
for attacking the school finance system, as it was in California after the
federal equal protection clause was no longer available. Finally, in Texas,
where the original litigation was based solely on the federal equal protection
clause, 4 the focus turned to revision of the education clause of the state
constitution. The objective of reform advocates in that state was to adopt
constitutional language such that a Robinson v. Cahill holding would be the
inevitable result of litigation.
Thus either a state's equal protection clause or its clause mandating
the provision of education can be used as the basis for an attack on the
1 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
2 Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
Z San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
4 Although the federal district court analyzed the case solely on federal equal protection
grounds, in ordering that a new school financing system be devised, the court indicated that
such a financing system must be one which would violate neither the federal equal protection
clause nor the Texas equal protection clause. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School
Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 286 (W.D. Tex. 1971).
The Texas constitution's equal protection clause is found in article I, section 3: "All free men,
when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entided
to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services."
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school finance system. Those who urge the use of the state's equal protection
clause can take comfort in Justice Powell's statement in Rodriguez that a
fundamental interest is one which is either explicitly or implicitly in the
Constitution.5 Since almost all of the states have express constitutional
provisions obligating the state to ensure that its children are educated,'
arguably education is a fundamental right and the strict scrutiny test can
apply.
Not all of the states, however, have interpreted their equal protection
clauses in accordance with the two-pronged equal protection formula which
distinguishes the rational basis and compelling state interest tests. Nor do
the equal protection clauses have identical language. Some states have
constitutional provisions which parallel the U. S. Constitution's fourteenth
amendment,7 others have a "privileges and immunities" provision,8 or a
requirement that all laws have "general" applicability. 9
As Professor Tractenberg points out, most state courts have been
relatively conservative in interpreting their equal protection clause (New
Jersey and California being notable exceptions), so that for those states a
better strategy might be to resort to the education clause as the basis for
declaring the system invalid. State education clauses are of several dif-
ferent types. As previously noted, almost all state constitutions contain an
express provision guaranteeing a free public education. Seven states mandate
a "thorough and efficient" system of free public schools't---the clause on
which the successful Robinson litigation was based. Another nine use
either "thorough" or "efficient.""1  Nine states mandate a "general
and uniform" public school system and another ten guarantee either a
"general" or a "uniform" system.' 2 Thus, if the reasoning adopted in
5 411 U.S. at 33-34.
6See OFFICE OF EDUCATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH. EDUCATION AND WELFARE, STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND SELECTED LEGAL MATERIALS RELATING TO PUBL3C SCHOOL
FINANCE (DHEW Pub. No. (OE) 73-00002, 1973).7 See, e.g., N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or prop-
erty without due process of law; nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws."
s For example, California has a "privileges and immunities" clause as follows: "No special
privileges or immunities shall ever be granted which may not be altered, revoked, or repealed by
the Legislature; nor shall any citizen, or class of citizens, be granted privileges or immunities
which, upon the same terms, shall not be granted to all citizens." CAL. CONST. art I, § 21.
9 California's constitution provides: "All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform
operation." Id. art. I, § 11. The California courts have interpreted both section 21 and
section 11 as being analogous to the federal equal protection clause. "We have construed these
provisions as 'substantially the equivalent' of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the federal Constitution." Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d at 596 n.11, 487 P.2d at
1249 n.11, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609 n.ll.
In the trial court opinion, Judge Jefferson indicates that California applies the two-pronged
equal protection test independent of any compulsion of the U.S. Constitution. Memorandum
Opinion re Intended Decision at 30-31, Serrano v. Priest, Civil No. 938,254 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Apr. 10, 1974).
10 OFFICE OF EDUCATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, supra note 6, at 6.
Characteristics of state constitutional equal protection provisions, of due process provisions,
of education provisions, and of tax uniformity provisions are given, by state, in summary
tables. Id. at 4-7.
11Id. at 6.12 Id.
310
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION 311
Robinson were followed, a constitutional challenge might succeed in thirty-
four more states, the argument being that the state's school finance system
does not satisfy the "thorough and efficient" or "general and uniform"
clause of the state constitution.
The remaining states have education clauses more limited in nature,
such as those which mandate the provision of a "system of common
schools." 13 The Serrano opinion suggests that such a provision may not
be given as wide a scope as the "thorough and efficient" clause, 14 though
the interpretation of this provision by the California judiciary may not hold
true for other jurisdictions since the history and prior judicial interpretation
of similarly worded provisions varies from state to state.
A sample of five states can hardly yield conclusive findings; neverthe-
less, the thoughtful analyses which follow suggest some interesting patterns.
It appears that while Rodrigez may have seriously hampered attempts
by federal courts to restructure school finance systems, there is considerable
potential for judicial reform of school financing systems through the use
of a variety of state constitutional provisions.
A word of caution, however: a rush by school finance reform advocates
to get courts in other states to accept the Robinson precedent, as was
done with the Serrano decision, may not be the most effective strategy.
While Robinson may indeed turn out to be an important precedent in
other school finance litigation, alternative approaches should be developed.
The "putting all one's eggs in one basket" theory of litigation following
the Serrano decision did not work. No single legal theory or principle is
likely to be able to deal with the many facets of school finance-problems
differ from state to state as do state constitutions, statutes, and regulations.
Moreover, greater emphasis on inequalities in the resources that go to
children rather than differences in tax burdens which taxpayers must pay
might be a more fruitful line of attack. 15 Fiscal neutrality may have been
seen by some of its opponents (and some courts) as a principle which merely
guarantees taxpayer equality among districts within a state, rather than a
constitutional standard which would ensure equality for schoolchildren
within the state-presumably the primary concern of reformers.
BL
'3 CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5.
14 In Serrano, the plaintiffs had included among their allegations that the school financing
system violated article IX, section 5 of the California constitution: "The Legislature shall pro-
vide for a system of common schools by which a free school shall be kept up and supported
in each district at least six months in every year .. " The court stated that the word "system"
implies a "unity of purpose as well as an entirety of operation, and the direction to the
legislature to provide 'a' system of common schools means one system which shall
be applicable to all common schools within the state." [citations omitted] However,
we have never interpreted the constitutional provision to require equal school spending;
we have ruled only that the educational system must be uniform in terms of the pre-
scribed course of study and educational progression from grade to grade. [citations
omitted]
5 Cal. 3d at 595-96, 487 P.2d at 1248-49, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 608-09. Thus, the court rejected
"plaintiffs' argument that the provision in section 5 for a 'system of common schools' requires
uniform educational expenditures." Id. at 596, 487 P.2d at 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
15 One should bear in mind, however, that a major barrier to legislative reform when
attempting to address issues of educational equality is the question of who will bear the costs.
